Abstract: This article argues that Malthusianism as a series of discursive regimes, developed in the Victorian-era, serves in times of austerity to reproduce an elite understanding of social exclusion in which those in a state of poverty are to blame for their own situation. It highlights that Malthusianism is present in the public discourse, becoming an underlining feature in news coverage of the so-called 'underclass'. Our findings broadly contradict the normative claim that journalism 'speaks truth to power', and suggest instead that overall as a political practice, journalism tends to reproduce and reinforce hegemonic discourses of power. The piece is based on critical discourse analysis (CDA), which has been applied to a significant sample of news articles published by tabloid newspapers in Britain which focussed on the concept of the 'underclass'. By looking at the evidence, the authors argue that the 'underclass' is a concept used by some journalists to cast people living in poverty as 'undeserving' of public and state support. In so doing, these journalists help create a narrative which supports cuts in welfare provisions and additional punitive measures against some of the most vulnerable members of society.
Introduction
Contrary to the normative claim that 'journalism speaks truth to power' (Nichols, 2014) , an important body of scholarly research shows that overall the mainstream news media tends to reproduce prevalent discourses of power (Dijk, 1988; Hackett, 1984) . This is more often than not the case of news reporting of poverty and social exclusion in which the narratives tend to refer to people in a state of poverty as 'others' who are often blamed for their own condition supposedly because they lack the skills, the knowledge and sometimes even the will to drive themselves out of destitution (i Campos, 2014:13) . We argue that journalists tend to undertake this approach as they operate within the boundaries of the newsroom's specific discursive regimes. These regimes underpin news narratives within an ideological framework from which journalists develop the deontology that they use to assess and later frame news articles on poverty from an ethical point of view. For us, the prevalent discursive regimes are characterised by a Malthusian ideology 'which focuses on scarcity of resources instead of unequal wealth distribution and which emphasises the need to further private property to maximise the efficiency of economic growth' (Ross, 1998:2) .
As a result of these discursive regimes, news media -generally speaking-tends to represent poverty at the margins of society and, since the end of the Cold War, increasingly more as a natural and unavoidable phenomenon. Therefore, the news stories reported by journalists are not only framed by these particular discursive regimes but enhanced by the political economy of the news media outlets -dependent on commercial revenues-, which requires invisibilising structural explanations such as 'inequality' within media narratives. Indeed, media outlets depend on advertising revenue from companies, corporations and governments that are institutionally committed to preserve the status quo, all of which creates a specific dynamic and rationale across the different newsrooms. Therefore, in order to deal with these contradictions, journalists working for these news media outlets have to create a social reality in which poverty is seen as marginal to mainstream society.
Another key feature of these discursive regimes is the need to displace responsibility from structural conditions towards the individual. To be sure, individualising poverty has been an elite response to the problem since the days of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766 Malthus ( -1834 . Malthus argued that as 'hard as it may appear in individual cases, dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful' (Malthus, 1996) . For him and many of his contemporaries and followers the poor lacked the intelligence and ability to control their needs or drive themselves out of poverty.
It is in this context that we have looked at the notion of the 'underclass' as one of the most important rhetorical devices to convey a specific meaning of poverty to general audiences. As a language resource, the notion of the underclass allows journalists to consider poverty from a non-structural perspective. This notion provokes then a different rationality of poverty among the public by means of displaying emotions such as pettiness, irony and even contempt towards those in a state of poverty. This creates a space between the spectator and the person who suffers. A process often referred to as a 'regime of pity' (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2013) in which spectators encounter those who suffer in the media space.
Chouliaraki describes how within this regime news consumers themselves are 'part of the news narrative' however 'their emotions are, in fact, shaped by the values embedded in news narratives about who the "others" are and how we should relate to them' (Chouliaraki, 2013:11) . This regime ultimately confers and reinforces a sense of power to the viewer (Lugo-Ocando, 2015:173) .
In the context of Malthusianism, immigrants and benefit claimants in London, for example, are blamed in the journalistic narratives for the shortage of houses instead of a critical review of the privatisation of social housing during and after the Thatcher era. Those claiming disability benefits are often presented in these same newspapers as 'abusers of the system', instead of examining the shortages in the health system to diagnose and support those with disabilities that potentially could allow them to go back to work. Political and media discourses have also portrayed single mothers as a burden on society because they are linked to dysfunctional behaviour, receiving welfare and producing children who are portrayed as being likely to turn into criminals (Silva, 1996:178) .
Consequently, our research has examined news coverage of poverty since the 2007/8 financial crash by some key British tabloids and the use of the term 'underclass' by journalists. This research examines how the use of the 'underclass' by journalists has a historical precedent in news coverage of poverty. We argue that its use is mostly defined in terms of Malthusianism and through the idea of the 'undeserving poor' that dates back to the pre-industrial era.
The article is contextualised by outlining the political debates of these eras and how these discursive regimes have survived over the years, while exploring how they relate to contemporary debates about domestic issues such as welfare reform. The findings of this study suggest that the reporting of poverty presents it as an individual issue rather than a byproduct of structural forces. In carrying out this analysis, the research offers a critique of the way in which journalistic narratives legitimise and support discourses of power in relation to poverty. Indeed, the paper builds on this evidence to argue that these representations are bound up with the dominant political and economic paradigm that journalists work in, which is confined to specific discursive regimes.
Background
Our main claim is that the notion of the 'underclass' inscribes itself foremost within a Malthusian-inspired worldview that is adopted by journalists. The media use Malthusianism as a rhetorical device in order to reconcile contradictions between normative claims of journalism as an activity that holds power to account and the political economy that defines and censors the possible narratives that journalists are allowed to express. This might appear paradoxical to many as hardly any journalists would have read in their lives the original works of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766 Malthus ( -1834 . However, in reality prevalent discourses become widely disseminated and embraced by journalists (Fowler, 1991) , without them necessarily accessing the original sources. Instead, these discourses are often adopted in the newsroom as explanatory frameworks in order to facilitate reductionist approaches that support existing views within the editorial policy of the news media or set by what has been referred to as 'news cultures' (Allan, 1999) . This, we argue, became particularly evident after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent financial crisis of 2007/8, mainly because of the need to justify programmes of austerity that placed most of the burden and sacrifices on the most vulnerable, together with the perpetuation of irrational rewards systems to financiers, bankers and elites alike. It was a rhetorical exercise that required a type of rationale in which the blame for the crisis could be displaced to the 'others'. It is in this context that the 'underclass' as a notion that has been embraced as a convenient language device to bring a type of emotionality into the public that could facilitate advancing a non-structural logic in the analysis of both the events and subsequent policies that took place afterwards.
While Malthusian ideology has been one of the guiding principles of how poverty is framed in the newsroom since the 19 th century (Lugo-Ocando & Harkins, 2015:40) , there is also the long standing social classification of the poor into categories of 'deserving' and 'undeserving'; formalised through the Elizabethan poor laws (Boychuk, 1998:8) and which has been a predominant feature of the way journalism represents poverty in Britain (Golding & Middleton, 1982) .
In this context and by conceptualising poverty as a problem of scarce resources and overpopulation, Malthus was able to argue against poor relief for the 'able bodied' (Avery, 1997:62) , (Daunton, 1995:447) . This was to become a common stance within news discourses of the Victorian-era which argued that helping the 'undeserving poor' would lead to laziness, moral decline and degeneration (Serr, 2006) . This is a discourse that has been carried out all the way into the 21 st century and that now translates in our times in calls for necessary cuts and reforms to the welfare system to make sure that the money goes to 'worthy' recipients of benefits who can 'earn' what they get from society.
It is important to fully appreciate the profound impact of Malthusianism in all areas of public life during the Victoria-era. For example, Charles Darwin (1809 Darwin ( -1882 (Darwin, 1958) .
Nevertheless, the use of evolutionary theory to explain differences in human society was not done by Darwin himself but by others, most notably Herbert Spencer (1820 Spencer ( -1903 . The general notion of evolution was appropriated to explain why some people were wealthy and others were poor and why some societies succeeded while others failed. All these factors were explained through a concept which was to become known as 'social Darwinism' (Marks, 2007:151 (Spencer, 1851:323-4) .
This line of 'arch-individualist' thinking (Willson, 1950:359) , placed responsibility for poverty at the level of the individual while complementing the laissez-faire economic liberalism of the Victorian-era. The influence of these ideas was clearly summed up in 1914
by William Graham Sumner, the first professor of sociology at Yale, when he said: (Ruse, 2009:116) .
Let it be understood that we cannot go outside of this alternative: liberty, inequality, survival of the fittest; not-liberty, equality, survival of the un-fittest. The former carries society forwards and favours all its best members; the latter carries society downwards and favours all its worst members
To be sure, the ideology of social Darwinism stemmed from a Malthusian premise and served to justify the legacy of inequality that had developed following the expansion of the British Empire and the subsequent industrial revolution that stood on the shoulders of slavery proceedings. As a discursive regime, it shaped the views of many and framed the most prominent news stories published by newspapers in Britain until well into the inter-war period and after.
Despite common assumptions, the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps did not seem to curb the appetite for Malthusianism; although it did tone done some of its more explicit manifestations such as Eugenics. The post-second World War II settlement meant that Keynesianism and 'welfare consensus' would dominate policymaking (Harvey, 2005; Hutton, 1996) and public discourse until the 1970s as there was the need to articulate constantly a propagandistic response to Soviet menace during the Cold War. Throughout this period, Malthusianism was less appreciated in the context of laissez-faire thinking and instead adapted to the state-interventionist mode of the era, while surviving in the discourses of 'development' and 'progress' which demanded population control of those in the Global South (Connelly, 2008) (Kasun, 1988) .
However, following the economic crisis of the 1970s which led to the breakdown of the welfare consensus, Malthusianism in the public discourse was re-appropriated by those voices embracing classical economic thinking now in the face of neo-liberalism (Cockett, 1994) . This consequently had a profound effect on the overall approach that journalists undertook for the following decade. As some authors point out, 'free market ideas have been the main driving force shaping media policy since the early 1980s' (Steel, 2012:167) .
Described by critics as a period of neo-liberal hegemony, the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by 'privatisation, deregulation and cuts to government services' (Klein, 2007:444) . This can be seen by examining one of the key political debates during the neoliberal period which has centred around the public crisis of welfare expenditure (Golding & Middleton, 1982) . Indeed, as some have highlighted, social policy usually only becomes news when there is a political or economic crisis (Franklin, 1999:1) . These changes led to 'pressures to cut welfare and state benefits that had provided a safety net for the victims of economic change' (Critcher, 2003:64) . In this context, Critcher argues that this caused widespread insecurity amongst benefit recipients and 'many of the moral panics that accompanied these profound social changes could well be interpreted in terms of the politics of anxiety' (Critcher, 2003:64) .
According to Peter Golding, the media have subjected unemployed people in the UK to 'more blitzes than the Luftwaffe could ever have imagined possible' (Golding in Franklin, 1999:147) . Golding and Middleton's seminal study into media coverage of poverty described the first of these 'blitzes' as a 'welfare backlash of cruel and massive proportions'. They argue that the economic crisis had led to a culture of 'indicting welfare and convicting the poor for the crisis of economic fortune' (Golding & Middleton, 1982:3) . The 70s 'scroungerphobia' backlash set the 'rhetoric and vocabulary' for future reporting of welfare stories (Golding in Franklin, 1999:147) .
Moreover, these media campaigns against welfare at this time were used as 'the occasion for a social derision of the poor so punitive in its impact' that it was to 'threaten the very props of the modern welfare state' (Golding & Middleton, 1982:5) . Stanley Cohen argues that 'cutbacks in welfare state provisions during the Thatcher years were accompanied by the deliberate construction of an atmosphere of distrust' (Cohen, 2011:xi-xxi) . He uses 'dole cheats' and 'welfare scroungers' as examples of 'fairly traditional folk devils' (Cohen, 2011:xxi) . Deacon argues that the intensity of hostility towards abuse of the benefits system was greater than at any time since the Great Depression era (Deacon, 1978:1) . According to Deacon, official government investigations into abuse of the welfare system 'unearthed virtually no abuse' and he adds that 'the costs of one inquiry into fraudulent claims for dependant's benefits were eight times the amount discovered in over-payments' (Deacon, 1973:346) .
Other authors have argued that media attacks on 'scroungers' serve to 'transform the social problem of unemployment into a public crisis, if not moral panic, about welfare scroungers' (Franklin, 1999:2) . These voices underline the fact that the contemporary understanding of welfare is based partly on 'the pathology of individual inadequacy as the cause of poverty' (Golding in Franklin, 1999:146) , as it is far less painful to recognise poverty as a structural phenomenon in which there is collective responsibility. Indeed, this view that people 'seek individualised, rather than structural explanations for poverty' was also evident in the Joseph Rowntree Foundation's 2008 report into the way poverty is represented in the UK media (McKendrick et al., 2008) .
The discourses of the 'undeserving poor' in the US and UK have, since the late 1970s, morphed into a discussion about the existence of an 'underclass' (Gans, 1995; Katz, 1995; Lister, 2004) . The 'underclass' was created as a 'creature of journalism' and a great section of the media have frequently used the term as a synonym for poverty, thereby stigmatising the poor (Lister, 2004:107-109) . The term 'underclass' is used by many journalists to describe a group of people who pose a threat to society, by arguing that they are 'immoral'
and 'violent' (Gans, 1995; Katz, 1995; Lister, 2004) . Indeed, poverty discourse from the 1980s onwards became dominated by the idea of a growing 'underclass' (Katz, 1990:185) .
One of the reasons was that in the 'culture of capitalism' people were increasingly judged in terms of 'their ability to produce wealth and by their success in earning it' (Katz, 1990:7) .
In the 1980s and 1990s the hostile media campaigns were broadened to include single mothers as well as unemployed and homeless people (Franklin, 1999; Jones, 2011:67) .
Throughout the 1980s culminating in a peak of hostility in the early 1990s, single mothers also became 'folk devils' and were constructed as a 'potent moral threat' (Cohen, 2011:xxi) .
In this sense, Cohen argues that the demonization of single mothers is central to the theory of the 'underclass':
"Feckless mothers" get pregnant to obtain state welfare; they raise children who will be criminals of the future; absent fathers are present somewhere, unemployed and also living off the state (Cohen, 2011:xxi) .
In fact, this idea of the 'underclass' as a 'menace' would become a key definer in journalistic narratives from the 1990s onwards. Indeed, Kendall argues that media portrayals of welfare recipients and homeless people frequently present them in terms of posing a threat to middleclass values (Kendall, 2005) . Social class plays a strong role in framing stories about poverty.
In the U.S., for example, women receiving welfare are often 'stereotyped as lazy, disinterested in education, and promiscuous' (Bullock, Fraser Wyche, & Williams, 2001:230) . Furthermore, Baumann argues that the rise of the 'underclass' theory coincided with the end of the Cold War. The 'underclass' was used to fill the void that had been left by no longer credible theories of a foreign revolution (Bauman, 1998:67) . This idea that the 'underclass' represents a threat to the rest of us is common throughout the literature on the subject (Bauman, 1998; Lister, 2004) .
It is in this context that the notion of the 'underclass' in journalistic narratives needs to be understood as an enduring legacy of Malthusian ideas, which the mainstream news media tends to use to 'support and propagate the aspect of neo-liberal ideology concerning poverty and welfare ' (de Goede, 1996:352) . That, as we argue here, is the basis for the resilient presence of the Malthusian paradigm in the newsroom of today.
Methodology
This study used the Nexis database to search for national press articles containing the word 'underclass' for a five-year period between the 9 th August 2007 and the 9 th August 2012. The original date was chosen because it represented the beginning of the 'credit crunch' (Leader, 2012) . A five-year period was selected because it allows us to study the transition between New Labour (which stayed in power between 1997 and 2010) and a new government formed by a coalition of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. The sample encompasses 285 articles which were selected for a close reading to examine how the concept of the 'underclass' fitted into the wider ideology of the newsroom.
The main reason we have focussed on tabloid newspapers in our research is due to the fact that these media outlets play a pivotal role in shaping both the news agenda and public opinion in Great Britain, particularly in regards to popular culture (Conboy, 2002) and worldviews on poverty. Indeed, as some authors have pointed out, British tabloids have been able to create imaginary communities across their audiences in which people see the world in terms of 'outsiders' and 'insiders' and extend their influence beyond the boundaries of print (Conboy, 2006) .
In the context of discourses of poverty and the underclass, the tabloids have played historically one of the most important roles in telling people what to think about. For example, some research on tabloids in the UK has highlighted how important they have been in perpetuating for years notions such as that of the 'underclass' by using alternative language such as 'chav' in order to reinforce historical social classification of a certain type among the public (Hayward & Yar, 2006:9) . It is precisely because of this double role of being agenda shapers and public opinion definers that we have chosen to work with the tabloids in order to understand how public discourses on poverty have been articulated in the media.
The following table shows the way these articles were spread across different tabloid platforms:
Newspaper

Number of Articles
Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday 135
Daily and Sunday Express 77
Sun, News of the World and Sunday Sun 54
Daily and Sunday Mirror 19
The spread of these articles suggests that the concept of the 'underclass' is more likely to be employed by the newspapers who lean politically to the right rather than the left. The sole left leaning tabloid in this sample is the Mirror a newspaper which employs this discourse much less often than the other three newspapers. The volume of underclass articles in the Daily Mail also suggests that this concept is a key part of that newspapers ideology.
An analysis was carried out on these articles focussing specifically on the subject of the underclass and the research aimed to tackle three key questions about this group. The main purpose of this analysis was to examine the 'influential role of ideology' (Fernández Martínez, 2007:1).
1. The first question we asked was, who are the 'underclass'? That is to say, who do the news media describe and define as 'underclass'?
2. The second question asked was, how do the news media describe the social problem of the 'underclass' and how it relates to the discursive regime of Malthusianism?
3. Finally the study examines the solutions expressed by journalists to solve the 'underclass' problem in the context of their own ideologies and discursive regimes.
By examining the notion of 'underclass' we aim at answering these questions, which we hope will lead to a better understanding of how poverty is articulated in the public discourses within the much smaller sample of articles that were found in these two last publications.
Findings
One of the most important findings is that the British tabloid press has used the underclass label as a highly malleable label to describe 'jobless young men', 'single mothers' 1 , 'the unemployed' 2 and 'delinquent youths' 3 who are described as 'young thugs' 4 or 'teen yobs' 5 .
The label is also used -although far less often-to describe 'illegal immigrants' 6 and children 19-September-2007 who are falling behind in school who are referred to as part of the 'educational underclass '. 7 Overall, the underclass is mainly articulated as a pejorative term to describe both welfare recipients and criminals, who too often are also reported as being the same.
The language used is highly problematic as tabloid journalists describe the 'underclass' as 'feral' 8 , 'white chavs' 9 , 'chav types' 10 , 'a thuggish, feral underclass' 11 , who are part of 'the chav class, the great unwashed', 'freeloaders', 'scrounging on the dole', who according to these reports 'keep pushing out their soon-to-be-feral offspring' 12 . In the words of journalists writing these stories or their editors, members of the underclass are 'parasites', 'second-and third-generation scum' 13 , the 'feral, the feckless and the freeloaders', are also 'slappers - There is also a clear trope that marks the underclass as a lazy group that 'refuse to work.' 20 They are described as 'welfare scrounging' 21 ...'baby machine(s)' 22 , and constructed through these news discourses as a 'huge, idle underclass for whom work is a dirty word'. 23 These news discourses stigmatise people by describing them as the 'the feral, the feckless and the long-term useless [who] could breed with impunity. Usually after several cans of Stella while us hardworking, tax-paying mugs picked up the bill'. 24 They are exemplified as 'a feckless underclass who don't work and lay slumped in front of the TV stuffing their faces with deepfried lard'. 25 While developing a reputation for being lazy the underclass are also 'terrorising communities across Britain'.
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The use of particular brands of lager (Stella) and types of cooking (deepfried lard) create a vivid image which has a clear dimension of class prejudice. Slavoj Zizek argues that the process of creating these modern images started during the 'back to basics' campaign of the Conservative Government that followed the 'black Wednesday' crash of September 1992, where the image of the single mother on benefits was used as an embodiment of 'all the evils of society' (Zizek 2012).
The link between individuals who commit criminal acts and the underclass is made repeatedly across these news stories. They are described as being an underclass 'whose depravity goes so low, the extent of their evil often goes undetected'. 27 The conflation between criminals and welfare recipients as members of an underclass allows the British tabloids to select specific cases to criminalise whole communities of benefit recipients.
Descriptions such as 'feral', unacceptable if they were targeting almost any other social group, nonetheless are openly used as a metaphor to blur any distinction between crime and welfare. This discourse allows tabloid newspapers to describe the unemployed or single mothers in the same terms as they would describe a child murderer or a wild animal out of control. This link is made explicitly in the following article: This link between individuals who commit criminal acts and the underclass is made repeatedly. The sample shows an overall Malthusian discursive regime among the tabloids in the articulation of news. In these stories we find expressions about how an overgenerous 25 Lorraine Kelly, They weighed 92st and were held as examples of a feckless underclass who lay in front of the TV stuffing their faces with deep-fried lard, The Sun, 6-Jan-2010 26 News, Kid crime kings rise, The Sun, 10-February-2010 27 Martell Maxwell, Brandon mum still to blame, The Sun, 11-March-2009 28 Carol Malone, Baby P: They're ALL guilty, The News of the World, 16-Nov-2008 welfare system has led to a 'mushrooming underclass' 29 , which in itself is presented as a threat that is magnified by the underclass association with 'rampant violent crime' 30 .
Following the Malthusian rationale that charity towards the poor -welfare in this case-only perpetuates the problem. The British tabloids tend to conclude that the most serious political challenge facing the UK is 'rooting out the persistent underclass' 31 . Indeed, the development of an 'underclass' is explicitly linked in these news stories to welfare provision, when these newspapers state that 'we only have an underclass because we fund it with handouts' 32 .
According to these news reports, the 'generous welfare payments', also referred to as 'the poverty trap', have led to a situation where 'billions more [are] spent, insanely, making benefits more lucrative than a pay cheque. 33 These individuals are presented by the media as 'a problem we can no longer ignore, because the future prosperity of this country relies on the ability of generations to come making a valuable contribution'.
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Other articles bring back the notion of deserving and undeserving poor when they touch on unemployment by arguing that 'in a country where the dole figure has just passed 2 (Mills, 1959:9) .
The tabloid press has inverted this logic by blaming high unemployment on the personal characteristics of the 'underclass'. In so doing, the tabloid press has created a narrative paradox where the 'underclass' problem is due to the fact that 'the unemployed have become the unemployable'. 36 Here the Malthusian paradigm is used to solve this paradox by highlighting the 'inferiority' of those in welfare as it points out that they are 'unemployable' because they are not fit, which leads to calls to curb their numbers. Because of this preconception, the 2007/8 crises presented a unique opportunity to reintroduce more draconian narratives against those in benefits that echo the core of classical Malthusianism. Indeed, one proposed solution to the crisis made by the tabloids was to present benefit claimants with a stark choice of 'sterilisation or no more benefits', which echoes fully Malthusianism. 
Conclusion
As we have seen from this study, Malthusian discursive regimes have remained the most important paradigm in defining the way poverty is reported by the tabloid press in Great
Britain. It is a paradigm that seems to evolve and adapt after each economic crisis and subsequent period of austerity but that nevertheless seeks to constantly displace responsibility for the crisis from those in power towards those receiving charity or state benefits. What this research shows is that Malthusianism has mutated in each period into publically 'acceptable' rhetorical forms that are nevertheless able to carry with them the same message: that is, that some people deserve to be rich, some to be poor and that the poor do not deserve to exist.
Indeed, in this study we were able to observe that in times of financial crisis and austerity, Malthusian discursive regimes tend to be used by journalists in the tabloids as the default theoretical explanatory framework for poverty and as a guide to analyse public policy.
However, as we also saw, this process has been far from homogenous, particularly after World War II, during the Keynesian 'welfare consensus', in which Malthusian discourses opted for state interventionism to limit the 'expansion' of the poor by means of population control and forced sterilisation.
We also discussed how the 1980s brought about an era in which Malthusian discursive regimes returned to the more laissez-faire worldview. An era in which it was argued that cuts in the welfare budget were necessary to allow the market forces to reduce the numbers of people in poverty. The return of classic liberal economic policy through neo-liberalism also employed by journalists in the tabloid press only confirms the tendency of using such rhetorical devices as a decoy to displace responsibility for the crisis in times of austerity.
Indeed, our findings indicate that the Malthusian paradigm is present in the British tabloid press and that it deeply reflects the ideology and editorial policy of that segment of the media.
Despite government claims of being in this crisis 'together', the austerity plans have meant instead deep cuts in the welfare budget destined to the poorest and most vulnerable individuals of our society, while the richest continue with their affluent life styles characterised by bank bonuses and real estate bubbles. In light of this, the fourth estate instead of fulfilling its normative claims of speaking truth to power, seem to remain silent in the face of these excesses, celebrating instead lavish behaviour through stories about celebrities (Johansson, 2008) and business people (Boyle & Kelly, 2012) while blaming the most vulnerable for the state we are in.
Bibliography
